

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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P 242115Z SEP 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2305

INFO DOD WASHDC

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0064

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1974

(SALT TWO-442)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 24,
1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 24, 1974

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT,
WHICH WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED IS OF VERY TIMELY IMPORTANCE
IN TERMS OF IMPLEMENTING THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE
SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS
QUESTION IS AMONG THOSE OF PRINCIPLE WHICH ARE OF GREATEST
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE NEW AGREEMENT ON
THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD
UNTIL 1985, WHICH IS BEING NEGOTIATED, AND THEREFORE MUST

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BE COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDERED BY THE DELEGATIONS ON THE BASIS

OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF
UNITERAL ADVANTAGE.

AS A RESULT OF THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF BOTH OUR STATES
WE WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IN INTERNATIONAL
DETENT. IT MAY BE SAID THAT ENORMOUS IMPROVEMENTS HAVE TAKEN
PLACE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S.
THE NEXT TASK OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IS TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL
DETENT WITH MILITARY DETENT BY CONCLUDING APPROPRIATE
AGREEMENTS, AMONG THEM AGREEMENTS IN THE AREA OF LIMITING
STRATEGIC ARMS. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO STRENGTHENING UNIVER-
SAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO
REDUCING THE ARMS BURDEN WHICH WEIGHS HEAVILY ON THE
NATIONS.

RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN QUESTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS
IS OF PARTICULARLY GREAT IMPORTANCE. CONCLUSION IN 1972 OF
THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS, COMPLEMENTED AT
THE 1974 SUMMIT MEETING BY THE PROTOCOL WHICH PROVIDES FOR
A FURTHER LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS, AND CONCLUSION OF THE
1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO
THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WERE THE FIRST
MAJOR STEPTS IN CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. AS YOU KNOW,
THESE AGREEMENTS DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING
STRATEGIC ARMS AS A WHOLE. NEVERTHELESS, THEY DID ESTABLISH
AC CERTAIN SOUND FRAMEWORK WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMS LIMITED
BY THEM, AND CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS
TOWARD CARRYING OUT THE TASK DEFINED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN
COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974. WITH REFERENCE TO THE NEW
AGREEMENT, EVIDENTLY WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF
ESTABLISHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS FOR OTHER TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL, THEREBY EXPANDING THE
SPHERE OF RESTRAINT EXERCISED BY THE SIDES IN THIS AREA OF
VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL.

THE NECESSITY OF TAKING FURTHER STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION
IS DICTATED BY THE VERY NATURE OF THE ARMS UNDER CONSIDERA-
TION, AS WELL AS BY THE SITUATION WHICH HAS OME ABOUT IN
THIS FIELD. THE INTERESTS OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE DEMAND
THE SOLUTION OF A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO
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BOTH THE QUANTITATIVE AND THE AUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF VARIOUS
TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS. AS YOU KNOW, THE CONSTRUCTIVE
CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE NOTWITHSTANDING, IN THE U.S.
FOR A NUMVER OF YEARS WORK HAS BEEN UNDER WAY ON EXTENSIVE
DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON MINUTEMAN AND POSEIDON
MISSILES, ON DEPLOYMENT OF SRAM MISSILES ON STRATEGIC BOMBERS,
ETC. THE PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE
NUCLEAR-MISSILE SYSTEM AND OF THE B-1 STRATEGIC BOMBER ARE

BEING IMPLEMENTED.

IF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL THIS WERE OBJECTIVELY ASSESSED, IT COULD NOT BE SAID THAT THESE PROGRAMS SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF RESTRAINT. THEY LEAD TO A ONE-SIDED INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO A SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP IN THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OF ONE OF THE SIDES. AT ONE TIME IN THE U.S. THE REASON GIVEN FOR PLANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MRV/MIRVS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS WAS THE NEED TO OVERCOME ABM SYSTEMS. IT WOULD SEEM THAT AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE U.S. IN THIS MATTER MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. THIS, HOWEVER, DID NOT OCCUR. IT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE LIMITATIONS IN THIS FIELD AS WELL, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS IN MIND THAT THE AGREEMENT ON WHICH WE ARE TO WORK APPROPRIATELY REFLECT RESTRAINT. IN SO DOING, OF COURSE, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US TO BE GUIDED ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE OF THESE QUESTIONS WAS PRECISELY DEFINED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE VOTERS BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU L.I. BREZHNEV ON JUNE 16, 1974. CONCERNING THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, L.I. BREZHNEV SAID: "WE ARE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, EXERCISING MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR ARMAMENTS, AND FOR THEIR REACHING AN
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UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER NEWER STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS."

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT IN THIS FIELD WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND TO THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON THIS SCOPE. RESTRAINT, SPECIFICALLY IN THOSE DIRECTIONS WHICH WE MENTIONED TODAY, WOULD HELP US AVOID REPETITION IN THE FUTURE OF THE VICIOUS "ACTION-REACTION" CIRCLE THAT YOU SPOKE OF. MR. AMBASSADOR. MOVEMENT IN SUCH A CIRCLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED SOMETHING OBJECTIVELY NATURAL OR INEVITABLE. ON THE CONTRARY, COMPLETELY OBJECTIVE REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR AVOIDING THIS DO EXIST, GIVEN A MANIFESTATION OF GOOD WILL TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT.

THE NECESSITY FOR RESTRAINT IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS REQUIRES NOT ONLY UNFAILING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS IN FORCE OR BEING NEWLY WORKED OUT ON THEIR QUESTION, BUT ALSO NOT TAKING ACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE, ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO IN FACT CIRCUMVENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THESE AGREEMENTS. OTHERWISE, AFTER ALL, THE OTHER SIDE, PROCEEDING FROM THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, MIGHT FIND ITSELF COMPELLED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS IN RESPONSE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0064

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SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF NEITHER THE USSR, NOR THE U.S. THE INTERESTS OF OUR STATES ARE SERVED BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

WE NOTE, THAT AT THE 29TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY U.S. PRESIDENT FORD EMPHASIZED THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

PROCEEDING FROM THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, THE USSR

DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 RESTRAINT BY THE TWO SIDES BE EMBODIED IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT.

AGREEMENT ON THE EXERCISE BY THE SIDES OF MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS COULD CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE BASES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. RESTRAINT MUST BE SPECIFICALLY EMBODIED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY MUST BE WHOLLY BASED ON
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THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, BE EFFECTIVE AND VIABLE, AND MUST COMPLETELY PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT DUE TO ACTIONS TAKEN UNILATERALLY.

OF COURSE, IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US, AS IT IS DEFINED IN THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974. THIS MEANS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TIME FRAME OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AS WELL AS THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION. SPECIFICALLY, RESTRAINT MUST BE EXERCISED IN TERMS OF BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS.

IT WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE SIDES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC ARMS EVEN DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS, THE SOVIET SIDE IS DEEPLY CONVINCED, WOULD HAVE GREAT POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN THE VERY BROADEST TERMS: FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AS A WHOLE AS WELL AS ESPECIALLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

I WILL CITE A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE. IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BECAME EVIDENT CONCERNING THE ADVISABILITY OF BANNING CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. APPARENTLY, THE INTERESTS OF SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD BE SERVED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH EVEN NOW NEITHER OF THE SIDES TAKE STEPS TO DEVELOP OR DEPLOY SUCH WEAPONS. AFTER ALL, IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH ACTIONS WERE TAKEN, SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF BANNING SUCH TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT. CONVERSELY, THE EXERCISE BY THE SIDES OF RESTRAINT IN THIS RESPECT WOULD FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE.

I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT. IN THE JOINT
SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974 THE SIDES EM-
PHASIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY ON THE
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NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HAVING REAFFIRMED
THEIR MUTUAL INTENTION TO OBSERVE THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY
THEM UNDER THAT TREATY, INCLUDING ARTICLE VI THEREOF, THEY
EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF FURTHER INCREASING ITS EF-
FECTIVENESS.

WE HAVE NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS TAKEN NOTE OF
THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE GREAT
IMPORTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEING CONDUCTED HERE FOR
REACHING THAT GOAL.

THE EXERCISE BY THE SIDES OF RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER
DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD CONSTITUTE A
SERIOUS STEP IN TERMS OF CARRYING OUT THE OBLIGATIONS AS-
SUMED BY OUR COUNTRIES UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY AND REINFORCING THE REGIMEN OF NON-PROLIFERA-
TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE SOVIET SIDE IS INTERESTED IN HEARING THE U.S. DELE-
GATION'S VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF EMBODYING RESTRAINT IN
THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

UNQUOTE.

JOHNSON

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